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Abstract
This paper targets a series of potential issues for the discussion of, and
modal resolution to, the alethic paradoxes advanced by Scharp (2013). I
aim, then, to provide a novel, epistemicist treatment of the alethic para-
doxes. In response to Curry’s paradox, the epistemicist solution that I
advance enables the retention of both classical logic and the traditional
rules for the alethic predicate: truth-elimination and truth-introduction.
By availing of epistemic modal logic, the epistemicist approach permits,
further, of a descriptively adequate explanation of the indeterminacy that
is exhibited by epistemic states concerning liar-paradoxical sentences.
1 Introduction
This paper targets a series of potential issues for the discussion of, and res-
olution to, the alethic paradoxes advanced by Scharp, in his Replacing Truth
(2013). I aim, then, to provide a novel, epistemicist treatment of the alethic
paradoxes. In response to Curry’s paradox, the novel, epistemicist solution that
I advance enables the retention of both classical logic and the traditional rules
for the alethic predicate: truth-elimination and truth-introduction. By avail-
ing of epistemic logic, the epistemicist approach permits, further, of a precise,
descriptively adequate explanation of the indeterminacy exhibited by epistemic
states concerning paradoxical sentences such as the liar.
In Section 2, Scharp’s replacement strategy is outlined, and his semantic
model is described in detail. Sections 3-7 examine five, crucial issues for the
approach and the semantic model that Scharp proffers. The five issues target
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the following points of contention:
(i) Whether a positive theory of validity might be forthcoming on Scharp’s
approach, given that Scharp expresses sympathy with treatments on which –
in virtue of Curry’s paradox – validity is not identical with necessary truth-
preservation;
(ii) The failure of compositionality in Scharp’s Theory of Ascending and
Descending Truth (ADT) and whether the theory is not, then, in tension with
natural language semantics. The foregoing might be pernicious, given Scharp’s
use of consistency with natural language semantics as a condition for the success
of approaches to the paradoxes. A related issue concerns whether it is sufficient
to redress the failure of compositionality by availing of hybrid conditions which
satisfy both Ascending and Descending Truth;
(iii) Whether ADT can generalize, in order to account for other philosophical
issues that concern indeterminacy;
(iv) Whether Descending Truth and Ascending Truth can countenance the
manner in which truth interacts with objectivity. It is unclear, e.g., how the
theorems unique to each of Descending Truth and Ascending Truth – respec-
tively, T-Elimination and T-Introduction – can capture distinctions between the
reality of the propositions mapping to 1 in mathematical inquiry, by contrast to
propositions – about humor, e.g. – whose mapping to 1 might be satisfied by
more deflationary conditions; and
(v) Whether the replacement strategy in general and ADT in particular can
be circumvented, in virtue of approaches to the alethic paradoxes which endeavor
to resolve them by targeting constraints on the contents of propositions and the
values that they signify.
Despite the critical issues that are raised for the approach, I believe that
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the theory of ADT can be extended in order to solve several other types of
paradox, beyond the paradoxes of self-reference. Scharp disavows of a unified
approach to all paradoxical phenomena. However, because the theory of As-
cending and Descending Truth appears to be extendible to several paradoxes, it
might repay the attempt to examine the theory’s possible strengths. In Section
5, I outline, therefore, extensions of Scharp’s ADT theory to the preface para-
dox; to the property version of Russell’s paradox in the setting of unrestricted
quantification; to probabilistic self-reference; and to the sorites paradox.
Finally, Section 8 examines the alethic paradoxes in the setting of epistemic
logic. My epistemicist theory avoids the series of issues adducing against the
ADT approach. I outline a novel, epistemicist solution to Curry’s paradox,
and provide a precise explanation of the epistemic indeterminacy expressed by
agent’s attitudes toward the liar sentence.
2 Scharp’s Replacement Theory
Scharp avers that two main alethic principles target the use of the predicate as
a device of endorsement and as a device of rejection. When the truth predicate
is governed by (T-Out), then it can be deployed in the guise of a device of
endorsement. When the truth predicate is governed by (T-In), then it can be
deployed in the guise of a device of rejection.
Scharp’s theory aims to replace truth with two distinct concepts. His explicit
maneuver is to delineate the two, smallest inconsistent subsets of alethic princi-
ples; and then to pair one of the subsets with one of the replacement concepts,
and the other subset with the second replacement concept.
Thus, one replacement concept will be governed by (T-In) and not by (T-
Out); and the second replacement concept will be governed by (T-Out) and not
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by (T-In).
Scharp refers to one of his two, preferred replacement concepts as Descending
Truth (henceforth DT). DT is governed by (T-Out).
Scharp refers to the second of his two, preferred replacement concepts as
Ascending Truth (henceforth AT). AT is governed by (T-In).
In his ’Syntactical Treatments of Modality, with Corollaries on Reflexion
Principles and Finite Axiomatizability’ (1963), Montague proved that, for any
predicate H(x), the following conditions on the predicate are inconsistent.
Montague’s (1963) Lemma 3:
(i) All instances of H(φ) → φ are theorems.
(ii) All instances of H[H(φ) → φ] are theorems.
(iii) All instances of H(φ), where φ is a logical axiom, are theorems.
(iv) All instances of H(φ → ψ) → [H(φ) → H(ψ)] are theorems.
(v) Q – i.e., Robinson Arithmetic – is a subtheory.
Scharp notes that Montague’s conditions target only Predicate-Elimination,
and are thus apt for governing DT.
Scharp argues that (v) is necessary, in order for languages that express the
theory to refer to their own sentences. Condition (i) is necessary, because it
captures (T-Out). Condition (ii) is necessary, because denying iterations of DT
entrains a version of the revenge paradox.
Thus, either Condition (iii) or Condition (iv) must be rejected. Condition
(iii) states that all tautologies are Descending True. Condition (iv) is an instance
of closure. In virtue of considerations pertaining to validity (see Section 3),
Scharp is impelled to reject (iv), s.t. DT cannot satisfy closure (151).
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2.1 Properties of DT and AT
Scharp argues that the alethic principles, DT and AT, ought to include the
following.
DT ought to satisfy:
[¬-Exc: D(¬φ) → ¬D(φ)];
[∧-Exc: D(φ ∧ ψ) → D(φ) ∧ D(ψ); and
[∨-Imb: D(φ) ∨ D(ψ) → D(φ ∨ ψ).
However, DT is not governed by:
[¬-Imb: ¬T(φ) → T(¬φ); nor by
[∨-Exc: T(φ ∨ ψ) → T(φ) ∨ T(ψ).
AT ought to satisfy:
[¬-Imb: ¬A(φ) → A(¬φ);
[∧-Exc: A(φ ∧ ψ) → A(φ) ∧ A(ψ); and
[∨-Imb: A(φ) ∨ A(ψ) → A(φ ∨ ψ).
However, AT is not governed by:
[¬-Exc: T(¬φ) → ¬T(φ)]; nor by
[∧-Imb: T(φ) ∧ T(ψ) → T(φ ∧ ψ).
Scharp argues, further:
–that classical tautologies are Descending True;
–that the axioms governing the syntax of the theory are Descending True;
–that the axioms of PA are Descending True, in order to induce self-reference
via Gödel-numbering; and
–that the axioms of the theories for both AT and DT are themselves De-
scending True (152).
DT takes classical values, and, in Scharp’s theory, there are no restrictions on
the language’s expressive resources. This is problematic, because ’a’ := ’¬A(x)’
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and ’d’ := ’¬D(x)’ can be countenanced in the language, and thereby yield
contradictions:
Because A(x) is governed by (T-In), ’a’ entails that A(a), although a states
of itself that ¬A(x). Contradiction.
Because D(x) is governed by (T-Out), ’d’ entails that replacing ’d’ for x in
’d’ is not a descending truth, i.e., ¬D(d)]. So – by condition (ii) – ’D[D(x)] →
x’ entails that it is not a descending truth that replacing ’d’ for x in ’d’ is not
a descending truth [i.e., ¬D(¬d)].
Thus, Scharp concedes that there must be problematic sentences in the lan-
guage for his theory, s.t. both the sentences and their negations are Ascending
True, and s.t. the sentences and their negations are not Descending True (op.
cit.).
Scharp endeavors to block the foregoing, by suggesting that DT can be
governed by both unrestricted (T-Out), as well as a restricted version of (T-
In). Similarly, AT can be governed by both unrestricted (T-In), as well as a
restricted version of (T-Out).
To induce the foregoing, Scharp introduces a ’Safety’ predicate, S(x). A
sentence φ is safe if and only if φ is either (DT and AT) or not AT.
Thus,
S(φ) ∧ φ → D(φ); and
S(φ) ∧ A(φ) → φ.
A sentence φ is unsafe if and only if φ is AT and not DT:
S(φ) ⇐⇒ D(φ) ∨ ¬A(φ).
From which it follows that:
¬S(φ) ⇐⇒ ¬D(φ) ∧ A(φ), s.t.
D(φ) → A(φ);
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¬∃φ[D(φ)∧ ¬A(φ)]
A(φ) → ¬D(φ); and
¬A(φ) → ¬D(φ) (153).
Scharp avers too that AT and DT are duals. Thus,
D(φ) ⇐⇒ ¬A¬(φ); and
A(φ) ⇐⇒ ¬D¬(φ) (152).
2.2 Scharp’s Theory: ADT/Xeno Semantics
Scharp’s Theory is referred to as ADT. The necessary principles comprising
ADT are as follows (cf. 154):
• Descending Truth
(D1): D(φ) → φ
(D2): D(¬φ) → ¬D(φ)
(D3): D(φ ∧ ψ) → [D(φ) ∧ D(ψ)]
(D4): [D(φ) ∨ D(ψ)] → D(φ ∨ ψ)
(D5): If φ is a classical tautology, then D(φ)
(D6): If φ is a theorem of PA, then D(φ)
(D7): If φ is an axiom of ADT, then D(φ).
• Ascending Truth
(A1): φ → A(φ)
(A2): ¬A(φ) → A(¬φ)
(A3): [A(φ) ∨ A(ψ)] → A(φ ∨ ψ)
(A4): A(φ ∧ ψ) → [A(φ) ∧ A(ψ)]
(A5): If φ maps to the falsum constant, then ¬A(φ)
(A6): If φ negates an axiom of PA, then ¬A(φ)
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• Transformation Rules
(M1): D(φ) ⇐⇒ ¬A¬(φ)
(M2): S(φ) ⇐⇒ D(φ) ∨ ¬A(φ)
(M3): S(φ) ∧ φ → D(φ)
(M4): A(φ) ∧ S(φ) → φ
(E1): If s and t are terms; s = t; and replacing s with t in a sentence p yields
a sentence q; then D(p) ⇐⇒ D(q)
(E2): If s and t are terms; s = t; and replacing s with t in a sentence p yields
a sentence q; then A(p) ⇐⇒ A(q)
(E3): If s and t are terms; s = t; and replacing s with t in a sentence p yields
a sentence q; then S(p) ⇐⇒ S(q).
2.3 Semantics for ADT
Scharp advances a combination of relational semantics for a non-normal modal
logic, as augmented by a neighborhood semantics. (A modal logic is normal if
and only if it includes axiom K and the rule of Necessitation; respectively ’[φ
→ ψ] → [φ → ψ]’ and ’`φ → `φ’.) He refers to this as xeno semantics.
A model, M, of ADT is a tuple, 〈D, W, R, I〉, where D is a non-empty
domain of entities constant across worlds, W denotes the space of worlds, R
denotes a relation of accessibility on W, and I is an interpretation-function
mapping subsets of D to W. The clauses for defining truth in a world in the
model are familiar:
〈M,w〉  φ iff w∈V (φ)
〈M,w〉  ¬φ iff it is not the case that 〈M,w〉  φ
〈M,w〉  φ ∧ ψ iff 〈M,w〉  φ and 〈M,w〉  ψ
〈M,w〉  φ ∨ ψ iff 〈M,w〉  φ or 〈M,w〉  ψ
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〈M,w〉  φ → ψ iff, if 〈M,w〉  φ, then 〈M,w〉  ψ
〈M,w〉  φ ⇐⇒ ψ iff [〈M,w〉  φ iff 〈M,w〉  ψ]
〈M,w〉  φ iff ∀w’[If R(w,w’), then 〈M,w’〉  φ]
〈M,w〉  φ iff ∃w’[R(w,w’) and 〈M,w’〉  φ]
2.4 Further Montagovian Desiderata
Problem 1: Montague (op. cit.) proved that the predicate version of axiom K
is inconsistent with (D1): D(φ) → φ; (D5): If φ is a classical tautology, then
D(φ); and (D6): If φ is a theorem of PA, then D(φ).
Scharp includes (D7) (159): If φ is an axiom of ADT, then D(φ). However,
while Montague was one of the most precocious philosophers of the twentieth
century, I suspect that Scharp does not mean to be attributing to Montague an
anticipation of his theory.
Problem 2: Montague (op. cit.) proved that the predicate version of Neces-
sitation is inconsistent with (D1): D(φ) → φ, and (D6): If φ is a theorem of
PA, then D(φ).
Problem 3: The third problem is supposed to concern whether the quantifier
domain is constant or variable. Scharp opts for constant-domain models without
argument, so it is unclear precisely what about the quantifier domain he is
targeting as problematic. (Cf. 6.7.7: 172.)
Problem 4: The fourth problem concerns the status of Scharp’s predicates,
AT and DT, in the relational semantics, given that the modalities in the logic
for the semantics are expressed by operators.
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2.5 Satisfying the Desiderata
To address Problems 1 and 2, Scharp augments his relational semantics with a
neighborhood semantics. M = 〈D, W, R, I〉 is thus enriched with a neighborhood
function, N, which maps sets of subsets of W to each world in W.
Necessity takes then the revised clause:
〈M,w〉  φ iff ∃X∈N(w)∀w’[〈M,w’〉  φ ⇐⇒ w’∈X]
Possibility takes the revised clause:
〈M,w〉  φ iff ¬[∃X∈N(w)∀w’[〈M,w’〉  ¬φ ⇐⇒ w’∈X]]
K and Necessitation need not hold on the neighborhood structure.
A counterexample to K in the neighborhood structure (160): Let Mk be a
neighborhood model, s.t. Wk = {a,b,c,d}; Nk(a) = {{a,b}, {a,c,d}}; Nk(b)
={b}; Nk(c) = {c}; Nk(d) = {d}; Vk(φ) = {a,b}; and Vk(ψ) = {a,c}. Thus,
〈Mk,w〉  φ; 〈Mk,w〉  [φ → ψ]; but it is not the case that 〈Mk,w〉  ψ.
So, K need not hold on the neighborhood structure. So, Montague’s proof
that the predicate version of K is inconsistent with Montague’s conditions on
predicates (interpreted, by Scharp, as expressing Descending Truth) is not per-
nicious.
A counterexample to Necessitation in the neighborhood structure (op. cit.):
Let Mn be a neighborhood model, s.t. Wn = {a,b}; Nn(a) = {{a}}; Nn(b) =
{{b}}; and Vn(φ) = {a,b}. Thus, φ can be true in W, while φ is false in
Nn(a).
So, Necessitation need not hold on the neighborhood structure. So, Mon-
tague’s proof that the predicate version of Necessitation is inconsistent with the
the conditions on Descending Truth is not pernicious.
So, Problems 1 and 2 can be answered.
However, the following rule is valid on neighborhood frames, and it entrains
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a fifth problem:
(L) If ` φ ⇐⇒ ψ, then ` φ ⇐⇒ ψ.
Problem 5:
The problem with regard to replacing modal operators with Descending
Truth predicates hinges on (L).
Scharp writes, e.g., that Gödel’s (1931) Diagonalization Lemma ’guarantees
that if our language can express Peano Arithmetic or its own theory of syntax
[. . . ] then it will have a sentence d, s.t. ¬D(d) is provably equivalent to d’ (161).
Scharp concedes that Gödel’s incompleteness theorem would yield that `ADT
¬D(d). He argues for this as follows: Suppose D(d), so if D(d) then d; but – by
the Lemma – if d, then ¬D(d); so if D(d), then ¬D(d).
Similarly, take another sentence in ADT, ’0 = 0’, then `ADT ¬D(d) and `’0
= 0’. However, assuming (L) and replacing the operators therein with predicates
entails that `ADT D(d) ⇐⇒ D[’0 = 0’]. Given that it is true in ADT that
D[’0 = 0’], then `ADT D(d).
Scharp argues that Problem 5 can be resolved by availing of the structure
built into his xeno semantics.
Let L be a language with Boolean connectives, and the operators , , and
Σ.  is the Descending Truth operator.  is the Ascending Truth operator. Σ
is the Safety operator. A xeno model M = 〈F,R,N,V〉 where F denotes a xeno
frame, R is an accessibility relation on wff in L, N is a function from W to 22w,
and V is an assignment-function from wff in L to the values [0,1].
Truth in a world is defined inductively as above.
The operators take the following clauses:
Descending Truth:
〈M,w〉  φ iff ∀w’∈W[Rφ(w,w’)→ ∃X∈N(w’)∀v∈W[〈M,v〉  φ ⇐⇒ v∈X]
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Ascending Truth:
P(φ) denotes the neighborhood structure – i.e., the set of subsets of worlds
– at which φ is true.
〈M,w〉  φ iff ¬[∀w’∈W[R¬φ(w,w’) → P(¬φ)∈N(w’)]
Safety:
〈M,w〉  Σφ iff ∀w’∈W[Rφ(w,w’) → P(φ)∈N(w’)] ∨ ∃w’∈W[R¬φ(w,w’) ∧
P(¬φ)¬∈N(w’)]
A reflexive and co-reflexive xeno frame is equivalent to a neighborhood frame:
(Reflexivity) ∀φ∀w∈W[Rφ(w,w)] ∧
(Co-reflexivity) ∀φ∀w∈W∀w’∈W[Rφ(w,w’) → w = w’]
In order to invalidate (L), Scharp constructs the following xeno model, M.
W = {a,b}
N(a) = {{a,b}}
N(b) = {{b}}
RS = {(a,a),(b,b)}
RT = {(a,a),(b,b),(a,b)}
P(S) = {(a,b)}
P(T) = {(a,b)}
∀w∈W 〈M,w〉  S iff 〈M,w〉  T. So, S ⇐⇒ T is valid in M.
However, ∀w’[RS(a,w’)] → P(S)∈N(w’), so 〈M,w〉  ¬T.
So, (L) is invalid in M, and Problem 5 can be answered.
A sentential xeno frame is acceptable iff
(i) ∀w∈W N(w) 6= ∅
(ii) ∀w∈W ∀X∈N(w) X 6= ∅
(iii) ∀w∈W ∀X∈N(w) w∈X
(iv) ∀φ∈L∀w∈W[Rφ(w,w)]
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(v) if φ and ψ are of the same syntactic type, then Rφ = Rψ
The interest of acceptable xeno frames is that they validate operator equiv-
alents of (D1) and (D2) in ADT. [(D1): D(φ) → φ; (D2): D(¬φ) → ¬D(φ).]
Suppose that 〈M,w〉  φ, so ∀w’∈W[Rφ(w,w’) → P(φ)∈N(w’)]. By (iv),
Rφ(w,w), so P(¬φ)∈N(w). By (iii), ∀X∈N(w)[w∈X]. So, w∈P(¬φ). Thus,
〈M,w〉  ¬φ. So, it is not the case that w is in P(φ). By (iv), P(φ) is not in
N(w). By (iii), ¬[∀w’∈W[Rφ(w,w’) → P(φ)∈N(w’). Thus, 〈M,w〉  ¬φ.
Problem 3 concerned whether the domain ought to be variable or constant.
Scharp prescinds from targeting any issues with regard (i) to quantification and
ontology, or (ii) to the interaction between DT, AT, and empirical sentences
(172). He opts for a constant-domain semantics, and thus defines constant-
domain xeno models (166):
A constant-domain xeno frame is a tuple, F = 〈W,N,Rf ,D〉. A constant-
domain xeno model adds an interpretation-function I to F, s.t. I maps pairs of
F and worlds w to subsets of D, s.t. M = 〈F,RM ,I〉.
A substitution is a function from a set of variables to elements of D. A
substitution v’ is x-variant of v, if v(y) = v’(y) for all variables y.
Thus,
〈M,w〉 v F[(a1), . . . , F(am)], where
ai is either an individual constant or variable iff 〈f(a1), . . . , f(am)〉∈I(F,w),
s.t. if ai is a variable xi, then f(ai) = v(xi), and if ai is an individual constant
ci, then f(ai) = I(ci)
〈M,w〉 v ¬φ iff it is not the case that 〈M,w〉 v φ
〈M,w〉 vφ∧ψ iff 〈M,w〉 vφ and 〈M,w〉 vψ
〈M,w〉 vφ∨ψ iff 〈M,w〉 vφ or 〈M,w〉 vψ
〈M,w〉 vφ→ψ iff, if 〈M,w〉 vφ then 〈M,w〉 vψ
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〈M,w〉 vφ⇐⇒ ψ iff [〈M,w〉 vφ iff 〈M,w〉 vψ]
〈M,w〉 v ∀x[φ(x)] iff for all x-variant v’ 〈M,w〉 v′ φ(x)
〈M,w〉 v ∃x[φ(x)] iff for some x-variant v’ 〈M,w〉 v′ φ(x)
〈M,w〉  φ iff ∀w’∈W[Rφ(w,w’) → ∃X∈N(w’)∀v∈W[〈M,w〉  [φ ⇐⇒
v∈X]
〈M,w〉  φ iff ∃w’∈W[R¬φ(w,w’) ∧ P(¬φ) is not in N(w’)
3 Issue 1: Validity
Scharp mentions Field’s (2008) argument against identifying validity with nec-
essary truth-preservation, although does not reconstruct the argument.
In order to argue against identifying validity with necessary truth-preservation,
Field draws, inter alia, on Curry’s Paradox.
The argument from Curry’s Paradox is such that – by (T-In) and (T-Out)
– one can derive the following. If φ is a false sentence then,
1. φ ⇐⇒ [T(φ) → ⊥]
2. T(φ) ⇐⇒ [T(φ) → ⊥]
3. T(φ) → [T(φ) → ⊥]
4. [T(φ) ∧ T(φ)] → ⊥ (by importation)
5. T(φ) → ⊥
6. [T(φ) → ⊥] → T(φ)
7. T(φ)
8. ⊥
So, necessary truth-preservation entails contradiction.
However, the argument need not be valid, if one preserves (T-In) and (T-
Out) yet weakens the logic. One can avail of the strong Kleene valuation scheme,
such that |φ| is ungrounded, i.e. maps to 1/2. One can then add a Determinacy
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operator, such that it is not determinately true that φ and it is not determinately
true that not φ; so, it is indeterminate whether φ.
Field argues, in virtue of the foregoing, that validity ought to be a primitive.
In more recent work, Field (forthcoming) argues that validity is primitive if and
only if it is ’genuine’, such that the notion cannot be identical with either its
model-theoretic or proof-theoretic analyses. As an elucidation of the genuine
concept, he writes that ’to regard an inference or argument as valid is to accept a
constraint on belief [. . . ; s.t.] (in the objective sense of ’shouldn’t’) we shouldn’t
fully believe the premises without fully believing the conclusion’ (op. cit.). (The
primitivist notion is intended to hold, as well, for partial belief.)
Scharp is persuaded by Field’s argument, and endorses, in turn, a primi-
tivist notion of validity, as a primitive canon of reasoning without necessary
truth-preservation. Scharp takes this to be sufficient for the retention of Con-
dition (iii), in Montague’s Lemma (151). Scharp does not provide any further
account of the nature of validity in the book. In later sections of the book, he
reiterates his sympathy with Field’s analysis, and also avails of Kreisel’s ’squeez-
ing’ argument (section 8.8), to the effect that the primitive notion of validity
extensionally coincides with a formal notion of validity (i.e., derivation in a
first-order axiomatizable quantified logic with identity). However, one potential
issue is that, in a subsequent passage, Scharp writes that: ’an argument whose
premises are the members of the set G and whose conclusion is p is valid iff
for every point of evaluation e [i.e., index], if all members of G are assigned
tM-value [i.e., an AT- or DT-value of] 1 at e, then p is assigned tM-value 1
at e’ (240); and this would appear to be a definition of validity as necessary
truth-preservation.
The primitivist approach to validity is the primary consideration that Scharp
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explicitly avails of, when arguing that closure ought to be rejected (Condition iv,
in Montague’s Lemma), rather than rejecting logical tautologies as candidates
for the axioms of ADT (Condition iii, in Montague’s Lemma) (151). So, further
remarks about the nature of validity would have been welcome. An objection to
prescinding from more substantial remarks about the nature of validity might
also be that Scharp exploits claims with regard to its uses. So, e.g., he writes
that ’a valid argument will never take one from descending truths to something
not ascending true’ (177). However, that claim is itself neither a consequence
of either Kreisel’s squeezing argument, nor the primitivist approach to validity.
4 Issue 2: Hybrid Principles and Composition-
ality
• ∧-T-Imb.
D(φ) ∧ D(ψ) → A(φ ∧ ψ)
v.
T(φ) ∧ T(ψ) → T(φ ∧ ψ)
• ∨-T-Exc.
D(φ ∨ ψ) → A(φ) ∨ A(ψ)
v.
T(φ ∨ ψ) → T(φ) ∨ T(ψ)
(cf. 147, 171)
Feferman’s (1984) theory countenances a primitive truth predicate (Feferman-
true, in what follows); a primitive falsity predicate; as well as a Determinacy
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operator (op. cit.). This is by salient contrast to Scharp’s approach, on which
truth is replaced with DT and AT. Scharp argues that Feferman overempha-
sizes the significance of the compositionality of his Determinacy operator, at
the cost of not having either logical truths or the axioms of his own theory
satisfy Feferman-truth. By contrast, Scharp believes that he can avail of hybrid
principles, such that it is not a requirement of ADT that Descending Truth and
Ascending Truth obey compositionality (157).
One objection to this maneuver is that AT and DT are separated, in the
hybrid principles, between the antecendent and consequent of the conditional.1
So, it is unclear whether Scharp’s hybrid principles are sufficient to redress
the failure of compositionality in ADT; i.e., there being truth-conditions for
sentences whose component semantic values are, alternatively, DT and AT.
A further objection is that the foregoing might be in tension with Scharp’s
repeated mention of natural-language semantics, in order to argue against com-
peting proposals. If natural-language semantics were to vindicate principles of
compositionality, then this would provide a challenge to the empirical adequacy
of Scharp’s ADT theory, and thereby the viability of his replacement concepts
for the traditional alethic predicate.
5 Issue 3: ADT and Indeterminacy
This issue concerns whether ADT might generalize, in order to account for
other philosophical issues that concern indeterminacy. Whether ADT can be
so extended to other issues, such as vagueness and types of indeterminacy, is
not a necessary condition on the success of the theory. However, it might be a
theoretical virtue of other accounts – e.g., classical, paracomplete, intuitionist,
1Thanks here to xx.
17
and supervaluational approaches – that they do so generalize; and the extensions
of logic and semantics to issues in metaphysics are both familiar and legion.2
E.g., McGee (1991) suggests replacing the truth predicate with (i) a vague
truth predicate, and (ii) super-truth. The replacement predicates are not in-
tended for deployment in inferences implicated in reasoning, such as conditional
proof and arguments by reductio (155). McGee introduces a Definiteness oper-
ator, µ, in order to yield the notion of super-truth relative to a set of precisifica-
tions. There is thus a truth predicate and a super-truth predicate. Super-truth
is governed by (T-In) and (T-Out). Vague truth is governed by neither.
Thus:
–If µ(p), then µ’T(p)’
(If p is definitely true, then ’p is true’ is definitely true)
–If µ(¬p), then µ¬’T(p)’
(If p is definitely not true, then ’p is true’ is definitely not true)
–If p is vague, then ’T(p)’ is vague
(vagueness here is secured by availing of the strong Kleene valuation scheme,
such that p is ungrounded, i.e. maps neither to true nor false, and rather to .5)
McGee endeavors to avoid Revenge, by arguing that
’u’ := ’u is false or u is vague’
collapses to u is vague. So, u is not definitely true, and not definitely vague.
Further, u is not derivable within McGee’s supervaluationist theory, nor within
a separate, fixed-point theory that he also advances.
Scharp raises several issues for the supervaluational approach. One issue is
that vague sentences cannot be precisified via supervaluation – i.e., rendered
determinately true – on pain of Revenge (156).
2Cf. Williamson (forthcoming), for an argument for the retention of classical logic despite
the semantic paradoxes, based on the abductive strength of its generalization.
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Scharp argues that Descending Truth and Ascending Truth obey (T-Out)
and (T-In), respectively, whereas – according to McGee – vague sentences do
not. So, McGee’s replacement restricts expressivity, whereas Scharp argues
that there are no expressive restrictions on his proposal. Scharp notes, as well,
that some of the axioms for McGee’s theory are not definitely true – and are
thus vague and not governed by T-Out or T-In – which would appear to be a
considerable objection.
However, Field’s (2008) approach – K3 plus a Determinacy operator, with
a multi-valued semantics for the conditional – would appear to remain a viable
proposal. Extensions of Field’s proposal can be to an explanation of vagueness
(Field, op. cit: ch. 5); to the logic of doxastic states (cf. Caie, 2012); and to
the model-theory of metaphysics.
With regard, e.g., to the extension of Field’s treatment of the paradoxes to
the logic of doxastic states, Caie demonstrates that – rather than rejecting the
Liar sentence – it would no longer be the case, by K3 and indeterminacy, that
one could believe the Liar, and it would no longer be the case that one ought not
to believe the Liar. In section 8, I provide an epistemicist approach to Curry’s
paradox and the Liar which is able to retain both classical logic and the normal
truth rules.
With regard to the extension of Field’s treatment of the paradoxes to the
logic and model-theory of metaphysics, consider the following. Given Curry’s
paradox, the validity of an epistemic norm might depend, for its explanation, on
one’s choice of logic. However, one’s choice of logic might depend for its explana-
tion on considerations from metaphysics. Suppose, e.g., that one distinguishes
between fundamental and derivative metaphysical states of affairs. The fun-
damental states of affairs might concern the entities located in 3n-dimensional
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spacetime, such as whatever is represented by the wavefunction. The derivative
states of affairs might concern emergent entities located in lower, 3-dimensional
spacetime, such as the clouds. In order to capture the priority of the funda-
mental to the derivative, fundamental states of affairs could take the classical
values, [0,1]; by contrast, derivative states of affairs could take the value .5 (in
K3+indeterminacy), such that – while fundamental states are always either true
or false – it is not determinate that a derivative state of affairs obtains, and it
is not determinate that a derivative state of affairs does not obtain.
On the supervaluational treatment of the paradoxes, the approach can more
generally be extended in order to account, e.g., for the metaphysical issues sur-
rounding fission cases and indeterminate survival. Approaches which avail of a
supervaluational response to fission scenarios, and similar issues at the intersec-
tion of nonclassical logic, metaphysical indeterminacy, and decision theory, can
be found, e.g., in Williams (2014).
Thus, while it is not a necessary condition on the success of treatments to
the alethic paradoxes that their proposals can generalize – in order, e.g, to aid in
the resolution of other philosophical issues such as epistemic and metaphysical
indeterminacy – there are viable proposals which can be so extended. The
competing approaches thus satisfy a theoretical virtue that might ultimately
elude ADT.
In his discussion of Priest’s (2006) inclosure schema, Scharp disavows of a
unified solution to the gamut of paradoxical phenomena (Scharp, 2013: 288).
Despite the foregoing, I believe that there are at least four positive extensions
of Scharp’s theory of Ascending and Descending Truth that he does not discuss,
and yet that might merit examination.
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5.1 First Extension: The Preface Paradox
The first extension of the theory of ADT might be to the preface paradox.
A set of credence functions is Easwaran-Fitelson-coherent if and only if (i) the
credences are governed by the Kolmogorov axioms; and it is not the case both (ii)
that one’s credence is dominated by a distinct credence, s.t. the distinct credence
is closer to the ideal, vindicated world, while (iii) one’s credence is assigned the
same value as the remaining credences, s.t. they are tied for closeness (cf.
Easwaran and Fitelson, forthcoming).3 Rather than eschew of consistency in
favor of a weaker epistemic norm such as Easwaran-Fitelson coherence, the ADT
theorist might argue that consistency can be preserved, because the preface
sentence, ’All of the beliefs in my belief set are true, and one of them is false’
might be Ascending True rather than Descending True. Because the models in
Scharp’s replacement theory can preserve consistency in response to the Preface,
ADT might, then, provide a compelling alternative to the Easwaran-Fitelson
proposal.
5.2 Second Extension: Absolute Generality
A second extension of Scharp’s ADT theory might be to a central issue in the phi-
losophy of mathematics; namely unrestricted quantification. A response to the
latter might further enable the development of the property versions of AT and
DT: i.e., being Ascending-True-of and being Descending-True-of. For example,
Fine (2005) and Linnebo (2006) advance a distinction between sets and inter-
pretations, where the latter are properties; and suggest that inconsistency might
3A credence function is here assumed to be a real variable, interpreted as a subjective prob-
ability density. The real variable is a function to the [0,1] interval, and is further governed by
the Kolmogorov axioms: normality, ’Cr(T) = 1’; non-negativity, ’Cr(φ) ≥ 0’; finite additivity,
’for disjoint φ and ψ, Cr(φ∪ψ) = Cr(φ) + Cr(ψ)’; and conditionalization, ’Cr(φ|ψ) = Cr(φ ∩
ψ) / Cr(ψ)’.
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be avoided via a suitable restriction of the property comprehension scheme.4 A
proponent of Scharp’s ADT theory might be able: (i) to adopt the distinction
between extensional and intensional groups (sets and properties, respectively);
yet (ii) circumvent restriction of the property comprehension scheme, if they
argue that R is Ascending True-of yet not Descending True-of. The foregoing
maneuver would parallel Scharp’s treatment of the derivation, within ADT, of
the Ascending and Descending Liars and their revenge analogues (see Section
2.1 above).
5.3 Third Extension: Probabilistic Self-reference
A third extension of ADT might be to a self-referential paradox in the proba-
bilistic setting. Caie (2013) outlines a puzzle, according to which:
(1) ’*’ := ¬CrT(*) ≥ .5
that is, (*) says of itself that it is not the case that an agent has credence
in the truth of (*) greater than or equal to .5. As an instance of the T-scheme,
(1) yields: ’T(*) ⇐⇒ ¬CrT(*) ≥ .5’. However, CrT(*) ought to map to the
interval between .5 and 1. Then, ’Cr(φ) + Cr(¬φ) 6= 1’, violating the normality
condition which states that one’s credences ought to sum to 1.
In ADT, the probabilist self-referential paradox might be blocked as fol-
lows. Axiom (A2) states that ¬A(φ) → A(¬φ); so if it is not an Ascending
Truth that φ, then it is an Ascending Truth that not φ. However, (A2) does
not hold for Descending Truth. Thus, in the instance of the T-scheme which
states that ’T(*) ⇐⇒ ¬CrT(*) ≥ .5’, the contraposition from ’¬CrT(*) ≥
.5’ to ’Cr(¬T(*) ≥ .5’ is Ascending True, but not Descending True. So, if the
4See Field (2004; 2008) for a derivation of the Russell property, R, given the ’naive com-
prehension scheme: ∀u1 . . . un∃y[Property(y) ∧ ∀x(x instantiates y ⇐⇒ Θ(x, u1 . . . un)]’
(2008: 294). R denotes ’does not instantiate itself’, i.e. ∀x[x∈R ⇐⇒ ¬(x∈x)], s.t. R∈R
⇐⇒ ¬(R∈R) (2004: 78).
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contraposition from ’¬CrT(*)’ to ’Cr(¬T(*))’ is not Descending True, then the
transition from ’Cr(φ) + ¬Cr(φ) = 1’ to ’Cr(φ) + Cr(¬φ) = 1’ is not Descend-
ing True. Similarly, then, to the status of the Descending Liar in ADT, the
derivation of contradiction from the probabilist self-referential sentence, (1), is
Ascending True, but not Descending True.
5.4 Fourth Extension: The Sorites Paradox
A fourth extension of ADT might, finally, be to the sorites paradox. Scharp’s
xeno semanics is non-normal, such that the accessibility relation is governed
by the axioms T (reflexivity) and 4 (transitivity), although not by axiom K.
Suppose that there is a bounded, phenomenal continuum from orange to red,
beginning with a color hue, ci, and such that – by transitivity – if ci is orange,
then ci+1 is orange. The terminal color hue, in the continuum, would thereby be
orange and not red. The transitivity of xeno semantics explains the generation of
the sorites paradox. However, xeno semantics appears to be perfectly designed
in order to block the paradox, as well: The neighborhood function in Scharp’s
xeno semantics for ADT is such that one can construct a model according to
which transitivity does not hold. Let Mk be a neighborhood model, s.t. Wk =
{a,b,c}; Nk(a) = {a,b}; Nk(b) ={a,b,c}; Nk(c) = {b,c}; Vk(φ) = {a,b}. Thus,
〈Mk,a〉  φ; but not 〈Mk,b〉  φ. So, it is not the case that 〈Mk,a〉  φ;
so transitivity does not hold in the model. Scharp’s semantics for his ADT
theory would thus appear to have the resources both to generate, and to solve,
the sorites paradox.5
5Scharp suggests that the truth predicate is contextually invariant, although assessment-
sensitive (9.4). A second means by which the proposal could be extended in order to account
for vagueness is via its convergence with the interest-relative approach advanced by Fara
(2000; 2008).
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6 Issue 4: Descending Truth, Ascending Truth,
and Objectivity
Scharp claims that considerations of space do not permit him to elaborate on
the interaction between Descending Truth, Ascending Truth, and objectivity
(Section 8.3). Suppose that – depending on the target domain of inquiry – the
truth-conditions of sentences might be sensitive to the reality of the objects and
properties that the sentences concern. So, e.g., second-order implicit definitions
for the cardinals might be true only if the terms therein refer to abstract entities.
By contrast, what is said in sentences about humor might be true, if and only
if the sentence satisfies deflationary conditions such as the T-schema.
Another objection to the replacement strategy, and of Scharp’s candidate
replacements in particular, is that it is unclear how – in principle – either De-
scending Truth or Ascending Truth can be deployed in order to capture the
foregoing distinctions.
7 Issue 5: Paradox, Sense, and Signification
One final objection concerns the general methodology of the book. Scharp
proceeds by endeavoring to summarize all of the extant approaches to the alethic
paradoxes in the literature, and to marshall at least one issue adducing against
their favor. However, there are two approaches to the paradoxes that Scharp
overlooks. The first approach targets the notion of what is said by an utterance,
i.e. the properties of sense and signification that a sentence might express. One
such proposal is inspired by Bradwardine (c.1320/2010) and pursued by Read
(2009). According to the proposal, if a sentence such as the Liar does not wholly
signify that it is true, then one invalidates T-Introduction for the sentence. In
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a similar vein, Rumfitt (2014) argues that paradoxical sentences are a type of
Scheingedanken, i.e. mock thoughts that might have a sense, although take no
value; so, T-Introduction is similarly restricted.
Scharp takes it to be a virtue of his account that he can retain the dis-
quotational principles, even though they get subsequently divided among his
replacement concepts. He might then reply to the foregoing proposal by sug-
gesting that they similarly induce expressive restrictions in a manner that his
approach can circumvent.
However, there are other approaches which avail of what I shall refer to as
the sense and signification strategy, and which eschew of neither T-Elimination
nor T-Introduction. Modulo a semantics for the conditional, K3 and indeter-
minacy at all orders ensures not only that hyper-determinacy – and therefore
an assignment of classical values to the paradoxical sentences – is circumvented;
but, furthermore, that revenge sentences cannot be derived either. Against this
approach, Scharp reiterates his concern with regard to restrictions on expres-
sion. He writes, e.g., that ’Field avoids revenge only by an expressive limitation
on his language’ (107). However, a virtue of the approach is that, as in xeno
semantics for ADT, T-Elimination and T-Introduction are preserved. Against
ADT theory, K3+indeterminacy does not arbitrarily select the alethic principles
that the semantic theory should satisfy. Crucially, moreover, the approach does
not say more than one should like it to, as witnessed, e.g., by the derivability
in ADT of both the DT and AT Liars and their revenge analogues. Rather, the
language of paracompleteness and indeterminacy demonstrates that – without
the loss of the foundational principles governing the alethic predicate – there
are propositions which can satisfy the values in an abductively robust seman-
tic theory, and thereby exhibit their content, although what they show cannot
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ultimately be said.
8 Epistemicism and Alethic Paradox
Finally, the second approach that Scharp does not consider is one that has
recently been developed by the present author. This approach provides an
epistemicist solution to the alethic paradoxes, and is able to retain both classical
logic and a univocal, non-replacement, alethic predicate which obeys both truth-
elimination and truth-introduction. In the epistemic modal system at issue, the
box-operator, , is interepreted as ’the agent knows that’ and the diamond-
operator, , is interepreted as ’the agent believes that’. Belief is the dual of
knowledge: ’Bφ ⇐⇒ ¬K¬φ’. The epistemic system validates axiom T, which
records the factivity of knowledge: ’Kφ → φ’. Curry’s paradox is, again, the
following:6
For any false sentence, φ,
1. φ ⇐⇒ [T(φ) → ⊥]
2. T(φ) ⇐⇒ [T(φ) → ⊥]
3. T(φ) → [T(φ) → ⊥]
4. [T(φ) ∧ T(φ)] → ⊥ (by importation)
5. T(φ) → ⊥ (by contraction)
6. [T(φ) → ⊥] → T(φ)
7. T(φ)
6Read (2010) notes that there are at least three forms of Curry’s paradox. One form,
attributed to Albert of Saxony, is conjunctive: for any sentence A, ’φ’ := A ∧ F(φ). A second
form, attributed both to Albert of Saxony and Bradwardine, is disjunctive: for any sentence
A, ’φ’ := A ∨ F(φ). A third form, owing to Löb (1955) is such that, for any sentence A:
’φ’ := T(φ) → A. Read (op. cit.) argues that T-introduction is the culprit in the first three
forms of the paradox. A fourth variation on Curry’s paradox can be found in Beall and Murzi
(2012), who replace the truth predicate with a validity predicate. A fifth form is targeted by
Field (2008), and is the version at issue in this talk. This form of the paradox is such that a
contradiction has a unique derivation, via the truth rules, given any false sentence.
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8. ⊥
Rather than weaken the logic in a type-free setting (Field, 2008); eschew
of contraction (Beall and Murzi, 2012); eschew of T-introduction in virtue of
defective properties of signification (Read, 2009); or retain classical logic for
abductive reasons and disband of one of the truth rules (Williamson, forthcom-
ing), the current approach argues that Curry’s paradox is classicaly sound; that
the normal truth rules can yet be retained; and that the paradox is problematic
only becuase it exhibits an instance of epistemic indeterminacy.
The epistemic indeterminacy entrained by Curry’s paradox occurs because
step 5 invalidates axiom K on its epistemic interpretation: ’K(φ → ψ) → (Kφ
→ Kψ)’. This provides a counter-instance to epistemic closure. To see this, let
φ denote ’T(φ)’ and ψ denote ’⊥’. Then:
(*) K(Tφ → ⊥) → [K(Tφ) → K(⊥)].
Our epistemic modal system validates reflexivity, or axiom T: ’Kφ → φ’.7
Thus, in (*), K(⊥) is false, because – by reflexivity – only truths can be known.
However, K(φ) can be known, because it is an instance of T-introduction. Thus,
the conditional in the consequent of (*) has itself a true antecedent and false
consequent, and is thus false. Finally, the conditional in the antecedent of (*),
’K(Tφ → ⊥)’ is true, in virtue of the proof of Curry’s paradox. So the instance
of K expressed in (*) has a true antecedent and false consequent, providing a
counter-instance to K; and so K is not a valid axiom in our system of epistemic
modal logic. Thus, what is problematic about Curry’s paradox is that – despite
7Whether the system validates further axioms is a question which requires separate treat-
ment. Axioms 4 [Kφ→ KKφ]’; G [BKφ→ KBφ]; 4.4 [K(φ ∧ BKψ)→ K(φ ∨ ψ)]; GL [K[K(φ)
→ φ]→ K(φ)]; and Grz [K[K(φ→ Kφ)→ φ]→ φ], have all been proposed as plausible axioms
of epistemic logic. If one follows Priest (op. cit.) in arguing that the sorites paradox and the
paradoxes of self-reference have the same form, and one believes that transitivity, i.e. axiom 4
on its epistemic interpretation, is the culprit in the sorites paradox, then perhaps eschewing of
axiom 4 with regard to the paradoxes of self-reference might be a viable, similarly epistemicist
approach. Cf. Williamson (1994; 2002), for the foundations of the latter proposal.
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being classicaly sound and entailing contradiction via the normal truth rules
– at least one of the steps in its derivation is epistemically indeterminate, by
invalidating axiom K.
To complete the epistemicist approach to alethic paradox, we target the epis-
temic attitude that one ought to bear toward the liar sentence. As mentioned,
Caie (2012) generalizes the strong Kleene valuation scheme, as augmented by
the determinacy operator, to the doxastic setting. In order to induce consis-
tency in an agent’s belief set, the belief operator is taken to be its own dual,
’B(φ) ⇐⇒ ¬B¬φ’. The operator is further governed by K [B(φ → ψ) →
[B(φ) → B(ψ)]], D ’[K(φ) → B(φ)], 4 [B(φ → BBφ), and E [¬B(φ) → B¬B(φ)].
By contrast to Caie’s approach, we target epistemic rather than doxastic logic.
In our epistemic logic, we avoid validating the conjunction of axioms 4 and
E, because their conjunction would entail that an epistemic agent’s consistent
theorizing is decidable, in conflict with Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem
(cf. Williamson, 2009). Because we should like epistemic agent’s theorizing to
be consistent, we avoid validating both 4 and E. The epistemic logic validates
axiom T. However, Curry’s paradox provides a case of epistemic indeterminacy,
by invalidating axiom K. To complete the epistemicist solution to the liar para-
dox, I believe that the epistemic attitude toward liar sentences is one of belief,
where belief is, again, the dual of knowledge: Bφ if and only if ¬K¬φ. Thus,
where λ is a sentence which asserts of itself that it is false, the descriptively
adequate and normatively permissible attitude to bear toward the sentence is
one of belief, such that one doesn’t know whether it is not true. To avoid con-
tradiction, we eschew finally of the D axiom, which records the seriality and
safety conditions, according to which one ought to believe φ only if φ is known:
Kφ → Bφ. Conjoining seriality to ’Kφ ⇐⇒ ¬B¬φ’, such that ’Kφ → Bφ’ and
28
’Kφ → ¬B¬φ’, would entail a consistency condition on belief that only ideal
agents could satisfy. Thus, the derivation of contradiction in Curry’s paradox
is epistemically indeterminate, and the attitude of believing the liar sentence
comprises a case of epistemic indeterminacy, as well: for all one knows it is not
the case that the liar sentence is true.8
8Acknowledgements:
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